June 3rd
The Japanese Invasion fleet in detected at 9:00 am and flight of nine B17s are sent to attack.
June 4th
Preparations for the Battle:
On the dawn of June 4th, Rear Admiral Fletcher had no idea where the Japanese were. An attack on Midway was imminent, but the location of the enemy's carriers remained unknown. Shortly before dawn, Yorktown launched ten VS-5 SBD-3s to search north of the US fleet, to a distance of 100 miles. While the Japanese were expected to approach Midway from the northwest, Fletcher wanted to be sure his own flanks were secure. He had his ships some 200 miles north-northeast of Midway, and Fletcher was confident the Japanese could not be to the south, nor did he expect them to launch a strike against Midway from more than 300 miles out.
On Midway, sixteen B-17s had taken off at 0415 to attack enemy transports approaching from the west, and 22 PBYs had set out to find the Japanese carriers.
Those carriers were now just 240 miles northwest of Midway - 215 miles west of Task Forces 16 and 17 - and readying their first strike. Under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu prepared 108 planes for launch: 36 Type 99 dive bombers, 36 Type 97 level bombers, and 36 Type 00 fighters as escort. Their mission was to soften the island's defenses and eliminate its air strength. The planes were in the air by 0440, when work immediately began on arming an additional 105 aircraft, to strike any American ships that might interfere. Cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and battleship Haruna launched float planes to search for an enemy task force.
An hour had passed since Yorktown had launched her SBDs when Task Force 16 intercepted a brief message from a Midway PBY at 0534: "Enemy carriers."At 0553, a second PBY radioed "Many planes heading Midway". At 0603, nearly half an hour after the original message, a solid contact report was received: "2 carriers and battleships bearing 320° distance 180 course 135 speed 25."
Quick calculations placed the Japanese 175 miles west-southwest from the US task forces. Fletcher decided to hold Yorktown in reserve, and at 0607 instructed Spruance's Task Force 16: "Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers as soon as definitely located." In Enterprise, Spruance and his staff discussed on battle plans. When he received Fletcher's message, Spruance decided to launch at 0700 to throw everything Task Force 16 had at the Japanese, who he estimated would be 155 miles distant when found by the attack group. Now, the Hornet and Enterprise were both prepared to launch an attack when the moment came.
Organizing the Planes:
Enterprise and Hornet directed their squadrons to form up overhead and depart as a group. The two air groups would operate independently, but squadrons within each - fighters, torpedo bombers, scouting and bombing squadrons - were to maintain contact and synchronize their attack.
When Enterprise began launching at 0700, her flight deck had at first, eight Wildcat fighters for Combat Air Patrol. Behind the Wildcats were 37 SBD-2 and SBD-3 bombers from Scouting and Bombing Six: six VS-6 SBDs carrying a single 500-lb bomb, thirteen with one 500-lb and two 100-lb bombs, and eighteen VB-6 SBDs armed with one 1000-pounder each bringing up the rear. By 0725, all the planes were in the air, less four with mechanical troubles, forming up and climbing in lazy circles over the Big E.
Hornet Air Group fared little better. It’s Torpedo and Bombing/Scouting squadrons parted ways soon after launch, unable to agree on the course to follow. Only Yorktown, which Fletcher ordered to begin launching at 0838, formed a well-coordinated strike. The Air Department ordered Yorktown's squadrons to make a "running rendezvous". The slowest planes - Torpedo Three's TBDs - launched first, and departed immediately. Bombing Three and Scouting Five launched next, followed by Fighting Three's fighters as escort. The faster planes overtook the slower planes, and the strike group proceeded as a whole.
The Japanese carrier force also had some problems. As late as 0640, all seemed to be going according to plan for the Japanese. Then twenty minutes later, nearly the same moment that Enterprise began launching, the leader of the Japanese strike, LT Joichi Tomonaga, contacted Nagumo: "There is a need for a second attack...". Then at 0710 the first of several groups of Midway-based planes found and attacked the Japanese carriers with discouraging results. Six TBF-1 Avenger torpedo planes went in first. Five of the TBFs were brought down by Zeroes and anti-aircraft fire, while the sixth - its control surfaces shredded by enemy shells, the gunner dead, the radioman and pilot wounded - survived to drop its torpedo and struggle back to Midway. There were no hits. Four torpedo-bearing B-26 Marauders, attacking moments later, and similarly failed to score a single hit.
No US ships were expected but the Nagumo immediately was convinced for a second strike. At 0715, Nagumo ordered that the planes reserved for attacking any naval targets, be rearmed to attack ground targets. The task was only partially complete, when cruiser Tone's No. 4 float plane found the US fleet ( dun dun dun).
At 0728, Tone's scout reported "ten ships, apparently enemy", roughly 240 miles north of Midway, steaming south-southeast at high speed. Nagumo now knew that the Americans had some resistance near Midway.
Attacks:
At 0755, sixteen dive bombers, led by Major Lofton Henderson, attacked Hiryu. Six planes, including Henderson's, were shot down by Zeroes before they could drop the bombs. The remainder kept on attacking, but could score only a single near miss. Only destroying one Japanese fighter as they escaped the enemy formation, just eight planes returned to Midway. Tone's scout now reported at 0809 that the enemy force was composed of cruisers and destroyers, five each. As soon as the report came, fifteen B-17s bombed Hiryu from 20,000 feet. The airmen scored no hits, with most of the 68 tons of bombs dropped falling wide of the target. A few minutes later, eleven obsolete Vindicator dive-bombers also from Midway approached, first aiming for a carrier, then targetting the battleship Haruna. Not a single hit was scored.
At 0820, as the Midway-based attacks ended, Tone's scout revised its earlier report: "Enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier." For the first time, Nagumo knew with certainty he faced an American force that was prepared. The news came as a shock: the Japanese plan assumed the American fleet would not arrive for several more days, but little did they know that the Americans had broken the naval code. Nagumo had two options: immediately launch the 36 dive bombers spotted on Hiryu and Soryu to attack the enemy carrier, or wait until his Midway strike was recovered and then prepare an all-out strike. Unable to spare fighters to escort the dive bombers, and not sensing the critical situation he faced, Nagumo chose to wait. He ordered the planes to rearm with torpedoes rather then bombs to attack the American carrier fleet. In order to save time, torpedoes were stacked on the decks.
At this time, the USS Nautilus SS-168 submarine pops up and launches a torpedo at the carrier fleet. It does not hit, but causes confusion between the ships.
At 0745 Spruance had ordered Bombing and Scouting Six to depart, even before Torpedo Six and its fighter escort were ready. Air Group Commander, LCDR C. Wade McClusky, had led his bombers southwest anticipating the Japanese there.
Fighting Six Commander, LT James S. Gray, and ten F4F-4 Wildcats were to protect VT-6's vulnerable TBD-1 Devastators. But at at 20,000 ft., Gray was unable to tell the difference between one torpedo squadron from another, so he joined the Hornet's Torpedo Eight. However, the commander of the group, LCDR John C. Waldron, lead the bombers to a different direction and did not coordinate with the other attackers.
However, Torpedo Eight was the first US carrier squadron to find the enemy fleet. Approaching low and from the northeast, the fifteen Devastators came upon Nagumo's force at 0920. Nagumo had abruptly changed course, from southeast towards Midway, almost due north, to evade further strikes from Midway and to close the American ships. At first, Waldron divided his squadron to pin the Akagi between two groups of planes, but as Zeroes swarmed over them, the Devastators began to fall to the Zeroes. Several were splashed almost immediately. The remaining planes pressed on, now targeting Soryu in the center of the Japanese formation, but of the fifteen planes, only Ensign George Gay dropped its torpedo and survived.
Torpedo Eight's attack just finished when Enterprise's Torpedo Six located the Japanese. Spotted by Japanese lookouts at 0938, Torpedo Six was also set upon by Zeroes. To make matters worse, Kaga soon turned north, forcing one of the planes into a stern chase.
The group's commander, Gene Lindsey, radioed for Jim Gray's Fighting Six using the pre-arranged signal, but there was no response from the fighters. After seeing the TBDs they believed were Torpedo Six disappear into clouds, Fighting Six had taken up station some fifteen miles northeast of the Japanese, on the opposite side of the fleet from VT-6's true position, and as a result, never participated in the battle.
As of such, one section of the Americans were cut down plane-by-plane by slashing Zero attacks. Only two of the seven Devastators survived to make their drops. Though damaged, both planes approached within 1000 yards of Kaga and made good their drops, but with no hits. Both aircrews survived the mission.
While the Japanese fighters attacked the other half of the group, Lindsey's section drew fierce opposition when they began their run-in. Four planes were destroyed immediately, one of them which was Lindsey's own. The remaining TBDs released their torpedoes to no effect, but escaped the enemy force.
Yorktown's Torpedo Three, despite having a small fighter escort, suffered too. Only one plane of VT-3's twelve ever returned to Task Force 17. Carrier Hiryu evaded the five torpedoes the squadron dropped.
All the torpedo squadrons did minimal damage, however they did achieve an important objective of separating the Japanese carriers.
No longer in close formation, Akagi was separated by 6000 yards from Kaga and Soryu, too far away for mutual anti-aircraft protection. The Hiryu was also too far to away and on the ships, the anti-aircraft guns had been brought down to low elevations to accommodate the torpedo bombers. In the carriers, the hangar decks were packed with armed and fueled planes. The torpedoes and bombs were still left on the decks with a dangerous situation.
The Japanese were supremely confident at this point. The strike being prepared could inflict tremendous damage on the American carriers, and the fleet's anti-aircraft defenses had coped well with the slow-moving torpedo planes. However, they still had not faced the fast-moving dive bombers simultaneously.
There were some problems with finding the carriers for the dive bombers though. The Yorktown's bombers reached the Japanese rather uneventfully, but Hornet's VB-8 and VS-8 failed to contact the enemy at all, flying north and some miles west of Nagumo, totally missing the battle. The 32 SBDs of Enterprise's Bombing Six and Scouting Six flew too far south and were returning north when at 0947, the commander, McClusky, spotted a single ship. Suspecting that it might be hurrying to rejoin the main Japanese force, McClusky turned his bombers to parallel the course of the ship, Arashi. At 1002, the Enterprise bombers found the Japanese main carrier fleet. McClusky radioed a brief contact report, and made for an attack position. Something was missing however, the SBDs had no enemy fighters interfering, no anti-aircraft shells bursting in their midst. Enterprise's SBDs began their attack unopposed.
Approaching from the southwest, McClusky attacked the Kaga and the Akagi. Hurtling downward at 450 feet each second, the SBDs yielded Kaga little time to react. Releasing at approximately 1500 feet, McClusky and his wingmen - ENS William Pittman and ENS Richard Jaccard - missed, but the next bomb, a 1000-pounder dropped by LT Gallaher, hit Kaga squarely in the flight deck, still with all the bombs and torpedoes stacked. The next two planes scored near misses. Only one plane, unable to recover from its dive, was destroyed. But behind them, a dive bomber scored a hit alongside Kaga's forward elevator and a second hit struck fueling equipment, spraying the bridge with burning gasoline. As many as six additional hits followed. In the hangar decks, fuel and munitions set off flames which soon overwhelmed the ship.
To the northeast, at 1026 Dick Best and the remaining planes of VB-6 attacked Akagi. Best, wingman, and ENS Frederick T. Weber, scored a hit and two near misses with 1,000-pound bombs on the carrier, with Best's bomb setting off munitions sitting unprotected in the hangar. The destruction was immediate. In just five minutes, Enterprise's Scouting Six and Bombing Six destroyed two Japanese fleet carriers. Kaga was abandoned at 1700 and sank at 1925. Akagi was abandoned just after Kaga slipped under the waves, and scuttled before the dawn June 5. Attacking nearly simultaneously with McClusky's SBDs, Yorktown's Bombing Three, led by LCDR Max Leslie, inflicted such extreme damage on Soryu that she too sank that evening. A single carrier, Hiryu, escaped damage the morning of June 4 and retaliate back by attacking Yorktown.
Before the Yorktown was attacked, Fletcher had again sent out his scouts: ten SBDs of "Scouting" Five launched at 1133 to search out to 200 miles.
Around 1150, Yorktown's radar had made unexpected contact with a group of planes 32 miles west-southwest. Launched at 1045, just after the devastating US dive-bomber attack, the strike group was guided to Yorktown by a float plane from the cruiser Chikuma. In the defense formed by VF-3, VF-8 and VF-6, eleven of the eighteen bombers were brought down. The rest reached positions ranging from west to southwest of Yorktown and began their dives.
The first two bombers to attack were blown to pieces by Yorktown's 1.1-inch anti-aircraft guns, but the first landed its 242-kg bomb and hit the stern. Then the remaining dive bombers scored a hit on the boilers and reduced Yorktown vitally.
Fletcher transferred his flag from the damaged Yorktown to Astoria at 1323. Less than ten minutes later, Hiryu launched her second strike: smaller than the first, it consisted of ten torpedo planes with six Zeroes as escort. By this time, the Japanese knew they faced three American carriers, and believed one of those carriers to be heavily damaged, if not sunk.
At 1427, the cruiser Pensacola CA-24 reported incoming planes 45 miles out. Again, VF-3 and Enterprise's Fighting Six were sent out to defend the Yorktown. Three Zeroes and five torpedo planes were lost to the Wildcats' guns although several torpedo planes did slip through, however. At about 1444, two torpedoes slammed into Yorktown's port side in succession, well below her waterline. Losing steam and electrical power instantly, Fletcher strongly supported Captain Buckmaster's command to abandon Yorktown at 1455.
To revenge the Yorktown, Spruance ordered a strike launched. Available on Enterprise were 25 dive bombers: seven from VS-6, three from VB-6, and the remainder from VB-3, all led by LT Earl Gallaher of Scouting Six.
Climbing to 19,000 feet, Scouting Six l attacked from out of the sun at 1705. Several Zeroes attacked the bombers before and during their dives, and destroyed some. The first three Dauntlesses missed the mark, but then followed a succession of four direct hits on the flight deck. Additional hits were scored by VB-3 and Dick Best's Bombing Six. Two other VB-3 SBDs fell to Zeroes during and immediately after the attack, but for the price of three planes, Enterprise and Yorktown had destroyed their fourth carrier of the day. Hornet's SBDs arrived fifteen minutes after this attack but upon finding Hiryu heavily damaged, they focused their efforts on ships in her screen but failed to score any hits.
The Enterprise and Yorktown bombers returned to Task Force 16 at 1808, shortly before sunset. At 1920, the last fighter from Enterprise's combat air patrol touched down, and for the airmen who had survived, the long, challenging day came to an end.
When hearing the news of the downed four carriers, Yamamoto cancelled the Midway bombardment shortly after midnight, June 5. Realizing the risk without air support of pressing on, At 0255, he ordered a general withdrawal. This marked the end to the main fight of the Battle of Midway and the demise of the Japanese carriers.
On the dawn of June 4th, Rear Admiral Fletcher had no idea where the Japanese were. An attack on Midway was imminent, but the location of the enemy's carriers remained unknown. Shortly before dawn, Yorktown launched ten VS-5 SBD-3s to search north of the US fleet, to a distance of 100 miles. While the Japanese were expected to approach Midway from the northwest, Fletcher wanted to be sure his own flanks were secure. He had his ships some 200 miles north-northeast of Midway, and Fletcher was confident the Japanese could not be to the south, nor did he expect them to launch a strike against Midway from more than 300 miles out.
On Midway, sixteen B-17s had taken off at 0415 to attack enemy transports approaching from the west, and 22 PBYs had set out to find the Japanese carriers.
Those carriers were now just 240 miles northwest of Midway - 215 miles west of Task Forces 16 and 17 - and readying their first strike. Under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu prepared 108 planes for launch: 36 Type 99 dive bombers, 36 Type 97 level bombers, and 36 Type 00 fighters as escort. Their mission was to soften the island's defenses and eliminate its air strength. The planes were in the air by 0440, when work immediately began on arming an additional 105 aircraft, to strike any American ships that might interfere. Cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and battleship Haruna launched float planes to search for an enemy task force.
An hour had passed since Yorktown had launched her SBDs when Task Force 16 intercepted a brief message from a Midway PBY at 0534: "Enemy carriers."At 0553, a second PBY radioed "Many planes heading Midway". At 0603, nearly half an hour after the original message, a solid contact report was received: "2 carriers and battleships bearing 320° distance 180 course 135 speed 25."
Quick calculations placed the Japanese 175 miles west-southwest from the US task forces. Fletcher decided to hold Yorktown in reserve, and at 0607 instructed Spruance's Task Force 16: "Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers as soon as definitely located." In Enterprise, Spruance and his staff discussed on battle plans. When he received Fletcher's message, Spruance decided to launch at 0700 to throw everything Task Force 16 had at the Japanese, who he estimated would be 155 miles distant when found by the attack group. Now, the Hornet and Enterprise were both prepared to launch an attack when the moment came.
Organizing the Planes:
Enterprise and Hornet directed their squadrons to form up overhead and depart as a group. The two air groups would operate independently, but squadrons within each - fighters, torpedo bombers, scouting and bombing squadrons - were to maintain contact and synchronize their attack.
When Enterprise began launching at 0700, her flight deck had at first, eight Wildcat fighters for Combat Air Patrol. Behind the Wildcats were 37 SBD-2 and SBD-3 bombers from Scouting and Bombing Six: six VS-6 SBDs carrying a single 500-lb bomb, thirteen with one 500-lb and two 100-lb bombs, and eighteen VB-6 SBDs armed with one 1000-pounder each bringing up the rear. By 0725, all the planes were in the air, less four with mechanical troubles, forming up and climbing in lazy circles over the Big E.
Hornet Air Group fared little better. It’s Torpedo and Bombing/Scouting squadrons parted ways soon after launch, unable to agree on the course to follow. Only Yorktown, which Fletcher ordered to begin launching at 0838, formed a well-coordinated strike. The Air Department ordered Yorktown's squadrons to make a "running rendezvous". The slowest planes - Torpedo Three's TBDs - launched first, and departed immediately. Bombing Three and Scouting Five launched next, followed by Fighting Three's fighters as escort. The faster planes overtook the slower planes, and the strike group proceeded as a whole.
The Japanese carrier force also had some problems. As late as 0640, all seemed to be going according to plan for the Japanese. Then twenty minutes later, nearly the same moment that Enterprise began launching, the leader of the Japanese strike, LT Joichi Tomonaga, contacted Nagumo: "There is a need for a second attack...". Then at 0710 the first of several groups of Midway-based planes found and attacked the Japanese carriers with discouraging results. Six TBF-1 Avenger torpedo planes went in first. Five of the TBFs were brought down by Zeroes and anti-aircraft fire, while the sixth - its control surfaces shredded by enemy shells, the gunner dead, the radioman and pilot wounded - survived to drop its torpedo and struggle back to Midway. There were no hits. Four torpedo-bearing B-26 Marauders, attacking moments later, and similarly failed to score a single hit.
No US ships were expected but the Nagumo immediately was convinced for a second strike. At 0715, Nagumo ordered that the planes reserved for attacking any naval targets, be rearmed to attack ground targets. The task was only partially complete, when cruiser Tone's No. 4 float plane found the US fleet ( dun dun dun).
At 0728, Tone's scout reported "ten ships, apparently enemy", roughly 240 miles north of Midway, steaming south-southeast at high speed. Nagumo now knew that the Americans had some resistance near Midway.
Attacks:
At 0755, sixteen dive bombers, led by Major Lofton Henderson, attacked Hiryu. Six planes, including Henderson's, were shot down by Zeroes before they could drop the bombs. The remainder kept on attacking, but could score only a single near miss. Only destroying one Japanese fighter as they escaped the enemy formation, just eight planes returned to Midway. Tone's scout now reported at 0809 that the enemy force was composed of cruisers and destroyers, five each. As soon as the report came, fifteen B-17s bombed Hiryu from 20,000 feet. The airmen scored no hits, with most of the 68 tons of bombs dropped falling wide of the target. A few minutes later, eleven obsolete Vindicator dive-bombers also from Midway approached, first aiming for a carrier, then targetting the battleship Haruna. Not a single hit was scored.
At 0820, as the Midway-based attacks ended, Tone's scout revised its earlier report: "Enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier." For the first time, Nagumo knew with certainty he faced an American force that was prepared. The news came as a shock: the Japanese plan assumed the American fleet would not arrive for several more days, but little did they know that the Americans had broken the naval code. Nagumo had two options: immediately launch the 36 dive bombers spotted on Hiryu and Soryu to attack the enemy carrier, or wait until his Midway strike was recovered and then prepare an all-out strike. Unable to spare fighters to escort the dive bombers, and not sensing the critical situation he faced, Nagumo chose to wait. He ordered the planes to rearm with torpedoes rather then bombs to attack the American carrier fleet. In order to save time, torpedoes were stacked on the decks.
At this time, the USS Nautilus SS-168 submarine pops up and launches a torpedo at the carrier fleet. It does not hit, but causes confusion between the ships.
At 0745 Spruance had ordered Bombing and Scouting Six to depart, even before Torpedo Six and its fighter escort were ready. Air Group Commander, LCDR C. Wade McClusky, had led his bombers southwest anticipating the Japanese there.
Fighting Six Commander, LT James S. Gray, and ten F4F-4 Wildcats were to protect VT-6's vulnerable TBD-1 Devastators. But at at 20,000 ft., Gray was unable to tell the difference between one torpedo squadron from another, so he joined the Hornet's Torpedo Eight. However, the commander of the group, LCDR John C. Waldron, lead the bombers to a different direction and did not coordinate with the other attackers.
However, Torpedo Eight was the first US carrier squadron to find the enemy fleet. Approaching low and from the northeast, the fifteen Devastators came upon Nagumo's force at 0920. Nagumo had abruptly changed course, from southeast towards Midway, almost due north, to evade further strikes from Midway and to close the American ships. At first, Waldron divided his squadron to pin the Akagi between two groups of planes, but as Zeroes swarmed over them, the Devastators began to fall to the Zeroes. Several were splashed almost immediately. The remaining planes pressed on, now targeting Soryu in the center of the Japanese formation, but of the fifteen planes, only Ensign George Gay dropped its torpedo and survived.
Torpedo Eight's attack just finished when Enterprise's Torpedo Six located the Japanese. Spotted by Japanese lookouts at 0938, Torpedo Six was also set upon by Zeroes. To make matters worse, Kaga soon turned north, forcing one of the planes into a stern chase.
The group's commander, Gene Lindsey, radioed for Jim Gray's Fighting Six using the pre-arranged signal, but there was no response from the fighters. After seeing the TBDs they believed were Torpedo Six disappear into clouds, Fighting Six had taken up station some fifteen miles northeast of the Japanese, on the opposite side of the fleet from VT-6's true position, and as a result, never participated in the battle.
As of such, one section of the Americans were cut down plane-by-plane by slashing Zero attacks. Only two of the seven Devastators survived to make their drops. Though damaged, both planes approached within 1000 yards of Kaga and made good their drops, but with no hits. Both aircrews survived the mission.
While the Japanese fighters attacked the other half of the group, Lindsey's section drew fierce opposition when they began their run-in. Four planes were destroyed immediately, one of them which was Lindsey's own. The remaining TBDs released their torpedoes to no effect, but escaped the enemy force.
Yorktown's Torpedo Three, despite having a small fighter escort, suffered too. Only one plane of VT-3's twelve ever returned to Task Force 17. Carrier Hiryu evaded the five torpedoes the squadron dropped.
All the torpedo squadrons did minimal damage, however they did achieve an important objective of separating the Japanese carriers.
No longer in close formation, Akagi was separated by 6000 yards from Kaga and Soryu, too far away for mutual anti-aircraft protection. The Hiryu was also too far to away and on the ships, the anti-aircraft guns had been brought down to low elevations to accommodate the torpedo bombers. In the carriers, the hangar decks were packed with armed and fueled planes. The torpedoes and bombs were still left on the decks with a dangerous situation.
The Japanese were supremely confident at this point. The strike being prepared could inflict tremendous damage on the American carriers, and the fleet's anti-aircraft defenses had coped well with the slow-moving torpedo planes. However, they still had not faced the fast-moving dive bombers simultaneously.
There were some problems with finding the carriers for the dive bombers though. The Yorktown's bombers reached the Japanese rather uneventfully, but Hornet's VB-8 and VS-8 failed to contact the enemy at all, flying north and some miles west of Nagumo, totally missing the battle. The 32 SBDs of Enterprise's Bombing Six and Scouting Six flew too far south and were returning north when at 0947, the commander, McClusky, spotted a single ship. Suspecting that it might be hurrying to rejoin the main Japanese force, McClusky turned his bombers to parallel the course of the ship, Arashi. At 1002, the Enterprise bombers found the Japanese main carrier fleet. McClusky radioed a brief contact report, and made for an attack position. Something was missing however, the SBDs had no enemy fighters interfering, no anti-aircraft shells bursting in their midst. Enterprise's SBDs began their attack unopposed.
Approaching from the southwest, McClusky attacked the Kaga and the Akagi. Hurtling downward at 450 feet each second, the SBDs yielded Kaga little time to react. Releasing at approximately 1500 feet, McClusky and his wingmen - ENS William Pittman and ENS Richard Jaccard - missed, but the next bomb, a 1000-pounder dropped by LT Gallaher, hit Kaga squarely in the flight deck, still with all the bombs and torpedoes stacked. The next two planes scored near misses. Only one plane, unable to recover from its dive, was destroyed. But behind them, a dive bomber scored a hit alongside Kaga's forward elevator and a second hit struck fueling equipment, spraying the bridge with burning gasoline. As many as six additional hits followed. In the hangar decks, fuel and munitions set off flames which soon overwhelmed the ship.
To the northeast, at 1026 Dick Best and the remaining planes of VB-6 attacked Akagi. Best, wingman, and ENS Frederick T. Weber, scored a hit and two near misses with 1,000-pound bombs on the carrier, with Best's bomb setting off munitions sitting unprotected in the hangar. The destruction was immediate. In just five minutes, Enterprise's Scouting Six and Bombing Six destroyed two Japanese fleet carriers. Kaga was abandoned at 1700 and sank at 1925. Akagi was abandoned just after Kaga slipped under the waves, and scuttled before the dawn June 5. Attacking nearly simultaneously with McClusky's SBDs, Yorktown's Bombing Three, led by LCDR Max Leslie, inflicted such extreme damage on Soryu that she too sank that evening. A single carrier, Hiryu, escaped damage the morning of June 4 and retaliate back by attacking Yorktown.
Before the Yorktown was attacked, Fletcher had again sent out his scouts: ten SBDs of "Scouting" Five launched at 1133 to search out to 200 miles.
Around 1150, Yorktown's radar had made unexpected contact with a group of planes 32 miles west-southwest. Launched at 1045, just after the devastating US dive-bomber attack, the strike group was guided to Yorktown by a float plane from the cruiser Chikuma. In the defense formed by VF-3, VF-8 and VF-6, eleven of the eighteen bombers were brought down. The rest reached positions ranging from west to southwest of Yorktown and began their dives.
The first two bombers to attack were blown to pieces by Yorktown's 1.1-inch anti-aircraft guns, but the first landed its 242-kg bomb and hit the stern. Then the remaining dive bombers scored a hit on the boilers and reduced Yorktown vitally.
Fletcher transferred his flag from the damaged Yorktown to Astoria at 1323. Less than ten minutes later, Hiryu launched her second strike: smaller than the first, it consisted of ten torpedo planes with six Zeroes as escort. By this time, the Japanese knew they faced three American carriers, and believed one of those carriers to be heavily damaged, if not sunk.
At 1427, the cruiser Pensacola CA-24 reported incoming planes 45 miles out. Again, VF-3 and Enterprise's Fighting Six were sent out to defend the Yorktown. Three Zeroes and five torpedo planes were lost to the Wildcats' guns although several torpedo planes did slip through, however. At about 1444, two torpedoes slammed into Yorktown's port side in succession, well below her waterline. Losing steam and electrical power instantly, Fletcher strongly supported Captain Buckmaster's command to abandon Yorktown at 1455.
To revenge the Yorktown, Spruance ordered a strike launched. Available on Enterprise were 25 dive bombers: seven from VS-6, three from VB-6, and the remainder from VB-3, all led by LT Earl Gallaher of Scouting Six.
Climbing to 19,000 feet, Scouting Six l attacked from out of the sun at 1705. Several Zeroes attacked the bombers before and during their dives, and destroyed some. The first three Dauntlesses missed the mark, but then followed a succession of four direct hits on the flight deck. Additional hits were scored by VB-3 and Dick Best's Bombing Six. Two other VB-3 SBDs fell to Zeroes during and immediately after the attack, but for the price of three planes, Enterprise and Yorktown had destroyed their fourth carrier of the day. Hornet's SBDs arrived fifteen minutes after this attack but upon finding Hiryu heavily damaged, they focused their efforts on ships in her screen but failed to score any hits.
The Enterprise and Yorktown bombers returned to Task Force 16 at 1808, shortly before sunset. At 1920, the last fighter from Enterprise's combat air patrol touched down, and for the airmen who had survived, the long, challenging day came to an end.
When hearing the news of the downed four carriers, Yamamoto cancelled the Midway bombardment shortly after midnight, June 5. Realizing the risk without air support of pressing on, At 0255, he ordered a general withdrawal. This marked the end to the main fight of the Battle of Midway and the demise of the Japanese carriers.
The Dive Bombers
The Japanese Carriers
Depicts the destruction of the Japanese carriers Akagi, Soryu, and Kaga.
June 5
On the night of June 5-6, Task Force 16 steamed west-northwest, arriving at a position 340 miles northwest of Midway by dawn. At 0510, Enterprise launched 18 SBDs - including planes from VS-6, VB-3, and the five Hornet SBDs - to search westward out to 200 miles. At 0645, a Hornet SBD reported an enemy battleship, accompanied by a cruiser and three destroyers, steaming slowly west. Forty-five minutes later, a second Hornet SBD dropped a message on Enterprise's flight deck, reporting two heavy cruisers and two destroyers, in approximately the same position as the earlier report.
Launching at 0757, Hornet put 25 Dauntlesses in the air, eight armed with 500-pound bombs, the rest with 1000-pounders. At 0930, Hornet Air Group commander CDR Stanhope Ring located the enemy ships, and at 0950 initiated the attack. His victims were the hapless cruisers Mogami and Mikuma.
Mogami took two bomb hits in this first attack, Mikuma several more. As Hornet recovered her strike at 1035, Enterprise prepared to launch her own: 31 Dauntless dive bombers, accompanied by the last three Torpedo Six Devastators, and an escort of 12 VF-6 Wildcats. Spruance, while convinced the torpedo planes could inflict critical damage on the enemy ships, could not accept further losses.
Enterprise's attack got underway at 1045. Led by LT Wallace Short of Yorktown's Scouting Five, the group passed over what appeared to be two cruisers and two destroyers at noon. After flying on another 30 miles in search of the non-existent battleships, Short turned back and started to attack the cruisers Mogami and Mikuma at 1215. Again Mogami absorbed two hits, but Mikuma took at least five, leaving her dead in the water, her topside utterly wrecked.
Launching at 0757, Hornet put 25 Dauntlesses in the air, eight armed with 500-pound bombs, the rest with 1000-pounders. At 0930, Hornet Air Group commander CDR Stanhope Ring located the enemy ships, and at 0950 initiated the attack. His victims were the hapless cruisers Mogami and Mikuma.
Mogami took two bomb hits in this first attack, Mikuma several more. As Hornet recovered her strike at 1035, Enterprise prepared to launch her own: 31 Dauntless dive bombers, accompanied by the last three Torpedo Six Devastators, and an escort of 12 VF-6 Wildcats. Spruance, while convinced the torpedo planes could inflict critical damage on the enemy ships, could not accept further losses.
Enterprise's attack got underway at 1045. Led by LT Wallace Short of Yorktown's Scouting Five, the group passed over what appeared to be two cruisers and two destroyers at noon. After flying on another 30 miles in search of the non-existent battleships, Short turned back and started to attack the cruisers Mogami and Mikuma at 1215. Again Mogami absorbed two hits, but Mikuma took at least five, leaving her dead in the water, her topside utterly wrecked.
June 6
The I-168, a Japanese submarine ordered to shell Midway, found Yorktown near noon. Since the evening of June 4, Hughes DD-410 had protected Yorktown, ready to torpedo the carrier should she be at risk of capture by the Japanese. Additional destroyers, including Hammann DD-412 arrived to cover her withdrawal.
By 1237, I-168 had slipped to within 500 yards of the carrier, which made only three knots in tow by the straining Vireo. The submarine fired four torpedoes at about 1334. One torpedo missed, one caught Hammann amidships and broke her in half, while the last two ripped open Yorktown's battered port side.
June 7
The damage was too much and at 0458, Yorktown, sank beneath the waves.